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REDISCOVERING STATE CONSTITUTIONS
JAMES G. EXUM, JR.*
I commend the North Carolina Law Review for devoting this issue to
state constitutional law and for persuading one most responsible for its
renaissance, retired United States Supreme Court Associate Justice Wil-
liam J. Brennan, Jr., to contribute to this body of work. In addition to
Justice Brennan's Essay, this issue includes professional Articles discuss-
ing the history and content of the North Carolina Constitution. Of par-
ticular importance to North Carolina lawyers are the issue's student
notes and comments reviewing recent decisions construing our state con-
stitution. These pieces demonstrate that state constitutional law is not
merely of intellectual interest; it is also of important practical
application.
State constitutions are a fundamental source of American law. The
earliest were ratified by citizens of the original colonies immediately after
the signing of the Declaration of Independence, years before a Federal
Constitution was drafted. Compared with the Federal Constitution, state
constitutions contain more detailed protections for the individual and, in
some cases, protections which have no parallel in the federal document.
For example, some state constitutions expressly provide for a right of
privacy,1 a right of access to the courts,2 or a right to public education.3
Although the Federal Constitution is popularly regarded as the ulti-
mate protector of individual rights, state constitutions often expressly of-
fer the individual even greater protection. As the United States Supreme
Court takes an increasingly minimalist view of the protections of individ-
ual rights provided by the federal document, close scrutiny of state con-
stitutions becomes increasingly important in this area.
Notwithstanding that law schools had given scant attention to state
constitutional law until the last decade, state constitutions have contrib-
uted to American jurisprudence for more than two centuries. The fram-
ers of the federal document drew heavily on the experience of delegates
* Chief Justice, Supreme Court of North Carolina. The author gratefully acknowledges
the assistance of Lucy N. Inman, his law clerk, in the preparation of this Essay.
1. E.g., ALASKA CONsr. art. I, § 22, construed in Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 498-504
(Alaska 1975).
2. E.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21, construed in Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 3-5 (Fla.
1973); N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 35, quoted in Pentuffv. Park, 194 N.C. 146, 157, 138 S.E.
616, 621 (1927).
3. E.g., N.C. CONST. art. I, § 15.
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to state constitutional conventions.' The Bill of Rights, not originally
included in the Federal Constitution, was added at the demand of dele-
gates to ratification conventions in states whose constitutions guaranteed
similar rights.'
State constitutions provided the first opportunity for American
courts to declare constitutions supreme over other laws. State judges,
quickly cognizant of the importance of this principle, were not hesitant
to invoke it. Law students usually are taught that the doctrine of judicial
review was first established by the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Marbury v. Madison.' This was true only for the federal judici-
ary, for Marbury was not the first American decision to assert the judicial
branch's authority to invalidate acts of the other branches of government
on the ground that they violate supreme law-a constitution. Fifteen
years before Marbury, the North Carolina Court of Conference," in Bay-
ard v. Singleton,8 invalidated a state statute because it violated the North
Carolina Constitution.
Bayard was an action in ejectment brought for the recovery of a
house and lot to which plaintiff claimed ownership. Defendant moved to
dismiss, contending that he held title from a superintendent commis-
sioner of confiscated estates. 9 A statute provided that where one could
"make affidavit" that he held such title, suits against him to recover the
land (presumably brought by those from whom the land had been confis-
cated or their successors) should be dismissed. ° Defendant produced
4. See Robert F. Williams, "Experience Must Be Our Only Guide" The State Constitu-
tional Experience of the Framers of the Federal Constitution, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 403,
404 (1988); see also James G. Exum, Jr. & Gary R. Govert, North Carolina and the Federal
Constitution: A Commitment to Liberty 15-16 (Sept. 1987) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the North Carolina Supreme Court Library) (discussing North Carolina delegates' contri-
bution to the Federal Constitution).
5. See Williams, supra note 4, at 422-23. North Carolina (and Rhode Island) refused to
ratify the Federal Constitution until the Bill of Rights was added. For accounts of North
Carolina's ratification process, see Exum & Govert, supra note 4, at 15-16; see generally Walter
F. Pratt, Jr., Law and the Experience of Politics in Late Eighteenth-Century North Carolina:
North Carolina Considers the Constitution, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 577 (1987) (discussing
the Hillsborough Convention, at which North Carolina failed to ratify the Federal
Constitution).
6. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
7. The North Carolina Supreme Court was not established until 1818, and did not hear
cases until 1819. Until then appeals were heard by the circuit-riding Judges of the Superior
Court, sitting as the Court of Conference. See Kemp P. Battle, An Address on the History of
the Supreme Court, 103 N.C. 339, 352-61 (1889); Walter Clark, History of the Supreme Court
of North Carolina, 177 N.C. 617, 619-20 (1919).
8. 1 N.C. (Mart.) 5 (1787).




such an affidavit and claimed the statute entitled him to a dismissal.
Holding that plaintiffs had a constitutional right to a determination of
their property rights by jury trial "unrepealable by any act of the General
Assembly,"' 1 the court denied defendant's motion to dismiss. The case
proceeded to trial, which defendant won.
In support of its decision to deny the motion to dismiss, the Court of
Conference noted that if the constitution 2 was altered or repealed by
statute, lawmakers "would at the same instant of time destroy their own
existence as a Legislature, and dissolve the government thereby estab-
lished."' 13 With "great reluctance... against involving themselves in a
dispute with the Legislature of the State," the court felt "bound to de-
clare," among other things that
by the constitution every citizen had undoubtedly a right to a
decision of his property by a trial by jury. For that if the Legis-
lature could take away this right, and require him to stand con-
demned in his property without a trial, it might with as much
authority require his life to be taken away without a trial by
jury [and] ... might with equal authority... render themselves
the Legislators of the State for life, without any further election
of the people .... 11
The court thus explained that a constitution is supreme law, and that it is
the responsibility of the judiciary to enforce its provisions, even against
other branches of government. Without such a check on executive and
legislative power, the court reasoned, our government could be reduced
to tyranny or dissolved into anarchy. Bayard has been characterized "as
the strongest precedent for judicial review prior to the Philadelphia
Convention."' 5
Marbury was a mandamus case. William Marbury and other plain-
tiffs brought an original action in the Supreme Court asking the Court to
issue a writ of mandamus to Secretary of State James Madison, compel-
ling Madison to issue commissions certifying their appointments by for-
11. Id. at 7.
12. The court referred throughout its opinion to the "constitution." See, e.g., id. at 5
("constitutional points"); id. at 7 ("That by the constitution every citizen had undoubtedly a
right to a decision of his property by a trial by jury"). This reference was to the North Caro-
lina Constitution of 1776, inasmuch as it was the only constitution available in North Carolina
in 1787, the Federal Constitution not yet having been ratified. See John V. Orth, Thinking
About Law Historically: Why Bother?, 70 N.C. L. REV. 287, 291 (1991).
13. Bayard, 1 N.C. (Mart.) at 7.
14. Id.
15. FRANK P. STRONG, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 62 (1950). Cf I Louis B.
BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 63 (1932) (describing Bayard as "heralded far and
wide as one of the cases in which the judiciary stood up for the protection of constitutional
rights, protecting the minority against the tyranny of the majority").
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mer President John Adams as Justices of the Peace in the District of
Columbia. The act of Congress that established the federal judiciary-
the Judiciary Act of 1789-authorized the Supreme Court "to issue writs
of mandamus in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to
* . . persons holding office under the authority of the United States."''
6
The first issue addressed in Marbury was whether the mandamus provi-
sion of the Judiciary Act violated Article III of the United States Consti-
tution, which declares that "the Supreme Court shall have original
jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases the
Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction."17 If the Act's manda-
mus provision did violate Article III, the second issue was whether the
Court had the power to say so; in other words, whether the Act, as ex-
pressing the will of Congress, was valid and binding on the Supreme
Court. The Court concluded that the Act, insofar as it authorized the
Court to issue writs of mandamus in the exercise of its original jurisdic-
tion, was contrary to Article III, and the Court had the power to declare
the Act void.18
Bayard and Marbury dealt with different sides of the same constitu-
tional question. Bayard discussed whether the legislature could deprive
the courts of their power to determine cases by jury trial even though the
state constitution guaranteed this method of resolution; Marbury ana-
lyzed whether Congress could confer on the Supreme Court the power of
mandamus even though the constitutional grant of jurisdiction did not
include this power. Because both cases examined powers of the very
courts that decided them, it was easier and more natural for the tribunals
to decide that they, and not the legislature, should be the final arbiters of
such questions. Each court could probably have reached the same result
by simply invoking the separation of powers doctrine. Yet both the
North Carolina Court of Conference and the United States Supreme
Court reasoned on broader grounds and thus laid the foundation for the
judiciary's claim to judicial review of all acts of the other branches of
government.
Chief Justice Marshall did not cite or otherwise refer to Bayard in
Marbury, but he likely knew of and probably had read it before compos-
ing his landmark opinion. The North Carolina lawyer who unsuccess-
fully argued defendant's cause on the motion to dismiss was none other
than Alfred Moore, who was serving as associate justice of the United
16. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 148 (1803).
17. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added); see Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at
173-74.
18. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 177.
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States Supreme Court when Marbury was decided.' 9 Moreover, Mar-
shall had argued cases in the United States Supreme Court during the
tenure of Justice James Iredell, another North Carolinian who, like Mar-
shall, was a staunch Federalist. 0 Additionally, Marshall served as Cir-
cuit Justice for the North Carolina District from 1801 until his death in
1835-a duty that demanded familiarity with North Carolina law.2
The similar reasoning employed in the two cases further indicates
that Marshall read and relied on Bayard. Both opinions referred to the
proposition that the constitutions before them were established by the
people themselves. Both commented on the organization of government
into three separate branches. And in both cases the judges referred to
their obligation-voiced in their judicial oaths of office-to uphold and
enforce a constitution. Finally, both opinions emphasized that a con-
trary holding would bestow unlimited power on the legislative branch-
power that could be exercised contrary to the will of the people, clearly
and unambiguously expressed in a constitution. 2
Several state courts have relied on their state constitutions to pro-
vide more protection of individual rights, than is provided by the Federal
Constitution. For example, nearly fifteen years ago the United States
Supreme Court sustained provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code in
a private commercial transaction against a federal due process challenge
19. Moore was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1799 by President John Adams to
replace Justice James Iredell, who incidentally had been the winning lawyer on the motion to
dismiss in Bayard. Moore, a strong Federalist, had previously served as North Carolina Attor-
ney General from 1782 to 1791. He resigned that position when it was replaced with that of
Solicitor General, which he considered to be unconstitutional. Moore resigned in 1804 due to
poor health. He died in 1810. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, CONGRESSIONAL QUAR-
TERLY'S GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 803 (Elder Witt ed., 1979).
20. See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 210-20 (1796) (summarizing Marshall's
argument on behalf of the defendant); Exum & Govert, supra note 4, at 2, 17-18.
21. See VI THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 399-402 (Charles F. Hobson ed., 1990)
(collecting opinions of the U.S. Circuit Court, North Carolina, June 1805); Martin H. Brink-
ley, "Where Justice Must be Equally Administered" Constitutional Decisionmaking in the
United States Circuit Court for the District of North Carolina, 1790-1805, at 70-149 (1992)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
22. See Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. (Mart.) 5, 7 (1787), quoted in part in text. In Mar-
bury the Court explained that to hold otherwise would mean that the Congress could impose
duties on exports from various states, provide for the conviction of treason on the testimony of
only one person, or pass ex post facto laws-all clearly contrary to express constitutional
prohibitions. It is particularly noteworthy that Chief Justice Marshall wrote, "If, however,
such a bill [of attainder or ex post facto law] should be passed, and a person should be prose-
cuted under it; must the court condemn to death those victims whom the constitution endeav-
ors to preserve?" Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 179. Compare this allusion with Bayard's
concern for condemning persons to death without the benefit of jury trial. Bayard, 1 N.C.
(Mart.) at 7. Of course, the Federal Constitution's jury trial guarantee was not added until
1791, four years after Marbury was decided. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
1992] 1745
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because no state action was involved.23 Less than a year later the New
York Court of Appeals, considering similar provisions of New York's
lien laws, concluded that no state action was required under its state con-
stitution's guarantee of due process. The New York court held the lien
laws, which violated debtors' state due process rights, could not be in-
voked by individual creditors.24 More recently, in United States v.
Leon,25 the United States Supreme Court engrafted on the rule excluding
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment a "good-faith"
exception. 6 When, however, a North Carolina defendant invoked the
state's constitution the North Carolina Supreme Court interpreted the
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures in Article I, Sec-
tion 20 as not allowing a "good-faith" exception.27
The narrower scope of protections in the United States Constitution
may be attributed to the political realities that brought about its exist-
ence. The sparse language of the Bill of Rights suggests that federal dele-
gates, representing a diverse and widely dispersed population and
wielding the power to dispute every word in the document, found it diffi-
cult to agree on details or a greater number of specified rights. By con-
trast, delegates to individual state constitutional conventions, who
represented more homogenous local populations, may have found the go-
ing somewhat easier.
As a result, state constitutions generally contain a longer list of indi-
vidual rights than the Federal Constitution, and their language is gener-
ally richer, more detailed, and more specific than that of the federal
document. Article I of the North Carolina Constitution, for example,
contains the Declaration of Rights, of which the Bill of Rights is the
federal counterpart. The Declaration of Rights contains thirty-six dis-
crete provisions, ranging from language lifted directly from the Declara-
tion of Independence in Section 12 to a reminder that "[t]he
enumeration of rights in this Article shall not be construed to impair or
deny others retained by the people" in Section 36.29
While the Bill of Rights speaks in terms of prohibitions against gov-
23. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 153, 156-63 (1978).
24. See Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 152, 157-67, 379 N.E.2d 1169,
1172-78, 408 N.Y.S.2d 39, 42-48 (1978) (construing N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6).
25. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
26. Id. at 917-26.
27. State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 710, 712-24, 370 S.E.2d 553, 554, 555-62 (1988). Other
state courts have reached the same result under their state constitutions. See, e.g., State v.
Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 144-59, 519 A.2d 820, 849-57 (1987) (construing N.J. CONsT. art. I,
§ 7).
28. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 1.
29. Id. § 36.
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ernment action, the North Carolina "Declaration of Rights," like similar
articles in other state constitutions, speaks positively and contains broad
grants of power to the people. For example, Article I, sections 12 and 13
of the North Carolina Constitution provide, respectively:
The people have a right to assemble together to consult for
their common good, to instruct their representatives, and to ap-
ply to the General Assembly for redress of grievances; but se-
cret political societies are dangerous to the liberties of a free
people and shall not be tolerated.30
All persons have a natural and inalienable right to worship Al-
mighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences,
and no human authority shall, in any case whatever, control or
interfere with the rights of conscience.31
How much richer are these detailed grants of individual liberties than the
mere prohibitions against abridgment of them found in the federal Bill of
Rights!
State constitutions also contain provisions for which there are no
federal counterparts. For example, Article I, Section 15 of the North
Carolina Constitution provides that "[t]he people have a right to the
privilege of education, and it is the duty of the State to guard and main-
tain that right."' 32 This provision has led the North Carolina Supreme
Court to invalidate a school-fee waiver policy designed to alleviate the fee
requirement for economically disadvantaged students because the school
board failed to provide adequate notice of the policy or the procedure for
using it.33 Other state courts have construed their state constitutional
educational guarantees to require equal opportunity for all students re-
gardless of financial circumstances. In Edgewood Independent School
District v. Kirby34 the Texas Supreme Court held that financial inequali-
ties among state school districts violated the Texas Constitution and re-
quired the state legislature to "establish and make suitable provision for
the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free
schools."' 35 In Rose v. Council for Better Education36 the Kentucky
Supreme Court held that Kentucky's public school system violated Sec-
tion 183 of the state constitution, which required the state to "provide an
30. Id. § 12.
31. Id. § 13.
32. Id. § 15.
33. Sneed v. Board of Educ., 299 N.C. 609, 610-20, 264 S.E.2d 106, 108-14 (1980).
34. 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
35. Id. at 394.
36. 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
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efficient system of common schools throughout the state."'37 After decid-
ing in 1989 that the entire statutory scheme for the public school system
was unconstitutional, the Kentucky Supreme Court announced that it
would withhold final judgment while the legislature scrambled to rede-
sign the school system during its next regular session.38
So long as a state court interpreting its state constitution does not
give individual rights less protection than the Federal Constitution re-
quires, the state court can employ a unique method of constitutional
analysis.39 To protect the integrity of its decision from federal review,
the state court must make clear that its decision is based on adequate and
independent state grounds.4° Moreover, using state constitutional law
permits state courts to be more innovative, and helps keep state law con-
stant in the face of changing winds that sometimes blow out of
Washington.
Differences between state constitutions and the United States Con-
stitution must always be resolved at the state level in favor of the individ-
ual right at issue. This does not always mean that the right prevails over
the other interests asserted; it means, rather, that if either constitution
favors the right, the right must prevail. Thus a state court interpreting
its state constitution may give greater, but never less, protection to indi-
vidual liberties than is mandated by the United States Constitution. 41
Under this principle of dual sovereignty, federal and state constitutional
rights "stand side by side . .. , a double-edge sword in the service of
freedom."'42
One of the tasks of an advocate is to make decisionmakers conscious
of points that tilt in the advocate's favor. In the law, this often becomes a
matter of raising the court's awareness of and educating the court about
principles that might persuade the court to decide in favor of the lawyer's
client. I hope this issue of the North Carolina Law Review will make all
who read it aware of the fertility of the field of state constitutional law.
It is, indeed, time to dust off these hallowed documents and use them in
the service of freedom and justice for all.
37. See Ky. CONST. § 183 ("The General Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, pro-
vide for an efficient system of common schools throughout the State.").
38. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 216.
39. For a discussion of cases in which the Supreme Court of North Carolina has em-
ployed a constitutional analysis unique to the North Carolina Constitution, see Harry C. Mar-
tin, The State as a "Font of Individual Liberties" North Carolina Accepts the Challenge, 70
N.C. L. REv. 1749, 1751-57 (1992).
40. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1037-45 (1983).
41. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723-24 (1985).
42. Exum & Govert, supra note 4, at 21.
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